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 Abstract 
 
The conversation between Islamic and secular scholars of law has been going on for a long 
time. Publications in European languages are flooding the market on almost any conceivable 
topic related to Islam. Yet, there is still little evidence of a proper dialogue, but merely of an 
exchange of monologues. Both sides are wary of engaging in open-ended discussion. For the 
Muslims, the divine origins of their religion, and consequently their attitude to the 
foundations of law-making, would seem non-negotiable; any addition based on secular 
thinking is likely to be viewed as forbidden innovation and watering-down of Islam and, in 
extreme cases, as an attack on the very identity of Islam. The secularists will consider some 
core Muslim teachings as being in breach of the fundamental freedoms for which people in 
the ‘West’ have fought for generations and with great sacrifice. This article advocates the use 
of the maqāṣid al-shari‛ah as a tool for advancing the debate. 
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This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi 
under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency. 
US Supreme Court, Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 1949 
(337 U.S.1 at 11 per Frankfurter J) 
 
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is 
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or 
narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the 
measure we call a foot, a Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would this 
be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: 
‘tis the same thing in a Chancellor’s conscience. 
John Selden, Table Talk, 16891 
 
When the Apostle of Allah ... intended to send Mu‛ādh ibn Jabal to the Yemen, he 
asked: How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises? 
He replied: I shall judge in accordance with Allah’s Book. He asked: [What will you 
do] if you do not find any guidance in Allah’s Book? He replied: [I shall act] in 
accordance with the Sunnah of the Apostle of Allah. ... 
                                                          
 
 
1 See, e.g., the entries on John Selden in C.N. Douglas (Ed.), Forty Thousand Quotations: Prose and Poetical, 
1917 – available online at www.bartleby.com/348/authors/486.html. 
2 
He asked: [What will you do] if you do not find any guidance in the Sunnah of the 
Apostle of Allah … and in Allah’s Book? 
He replied: I shall do my best to form an opinion and I shall spare no effort. 
The Apostle of Allah … then patted him on the breast and said: Praise be to Allah 
Who has helped the messenger of the Apostle of Allah to find something which 
pleases the Apostle of Allah. 
Sunān Abū Dāwūd, Ḥadīth No. 3592 
 
 
 
1 The Need for a New Style of Conversation 
 
The conversation between Islamic scholars and what we shall call, for want of a better word, 
secular scholars of law, has been going on for a long time. It is, however, an indisputable fact 
that since the rise of world-wide Islamist terrorism, aggressive Islamist propaganda, as well 
as more legitimate emanations of political Islam2 and the increasing visibility of Muslim 
sections of society in non-Muslim countries and fears of parallel communities3 in countries 
across the globe, the religion and with it its cultural and legal aspects have come much more 
clearly into the limelight. Many more people now want to know about ‘the Shari‛ah’, and 
some of them not least out of a combination of culturally superior voyeurism and possibly 
perverse titillation based on the Gothic medieval horrors of cutting off hands and feet, 
stoning, lashing, beheading, etc. Many new publications on all things Islamic in European 
languages have appeared and are continuing to flood the market; symposia and conferences 
on the ‘dialogue with Islam’ take place everywhere and on almost any conceivable topic. 
 
1.1 Dialogue – Not Exchange of Monologues 
However, this article, which is meant to be the first in a series around a research project into 
the figure and potential of the maqāṣid al-shari‛ah or the so-called Higher Intents of Islamic 
Law, is going to argue that currently there is little evidence of a proper dialogue, but rather an 
exchange of monologues. A dialogue means thrust and repartee, argument and counter-
argument, thesis and anti-thesis based on the mutual preparedness of the participants to 
consider their own stance and position in the light of the points put forward by the other side. 
In my experience, both sides are wary of engaging in such an open-ended discussion, for 
obvious reasons. For the (traditional) Muslims, on the one hand, the divine origins of their 
religion and consequently their attitude to the foundations and moral boundaries of law-
making with all its consequences would seem non-negotiable; any addition based on secular 
thinking is likely to be viewed as forbidden innovation and watering-down of Islam and, in 
extreme cases, as an attack on the very identity of Islam itself. This is the case 
notwithstanding the fact that the bulk of Islamic jurisprudence is actually man-made and 
based on human deductions from the original sources in similar ways, as we will see, as 
secular scholars would arrive at jurisprudential findings.4 The secularists, on the other hand, 
will see any reference to a religious basis as obsolete and anachronistic and consider some of 
the traditional interpretations of Muslim scholars and institutions in breach of fundamental 
                                                          
2 Although some are of the view that political Islam in its modern form was never intended in the original 
meaning of Islam and indeed never existed in its history; see M. Rohe, Das islamische Recht, 2nd edn. (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2009), p.  396. 
3 See, e.g., in the German context, J. Wagner, Richter ohne Gesetz – Islamische Paralleljustiz gefährdet unseren 
Rechtsstaat, (Berlin: Ullstein, 2011), and the recent debate in the UK about the place of the Shari’ah in the 
domestic legal order. 
4 See the overview of the different streams of arguments for possible reform and the counter-reform movements 
in Rohe, supra note 2 at 189; W.B. Hallaq, Shari‛a.Theory, Practice, Transformations, (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009), p. 500. 
3 
rights and freedoms for which people in the ‘West’ have fought over many generations and 
with great human sacrifice, most prominently the freedoms of speech and belief, as well as 
the role of women. Conservative and political Islam in particular are seen as a threat to the 
secular open and democratic society. 
 
1.2 Openness to Critical Discourse 
Nonetheless, criticism, especially of the hard-hitting sort, of material aspects of Islamic law is 
often considered culturally disrespectful and hence politically incorrect in the secular ‘West’, 
a concern from which many of their Muslim colleagues do not seem to suffer to the same 
degree vis-à-vis secular legal systems – indeed the unquestionable superiority of Islam as a 
way of life and law is, for example, openly expressed in the Preamble to the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, 5  and can still be found in modern textbooks on 
Islamic law, such as, for example, Attia’s treatise on the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, the 
very topic we shall engage with in this article: “The Apostle received from God the most 
consummate of all laws, one that offers benefits which human beings alone would not be able 
to realize”.6 
 Although maybe not so much of an issue in academic debate,7 the aggressive and not 
infrequently violent response to criticism of Islam, and especially its prophet Muhammad, 
encountered within the more extreme sections of Muslim society, may have had a severe 
chilling effect on the willingness of secular scholars to speak their mind freely, depending on 
the setting and context, as they would with regard to any other religion or ideology. An 
anecdote from my own experience may help to clarify the point: At a public lecture on the 
Shari‛ah in 2013 at a German university, one of the professors there told me about an essay 
she had set that year for her students. They had to discuss whether it would be permissible 
under freedom of speech principles to defame Muhammad or the Pope. Whilst almost all of 
them said it was perfectly acceptable under freedom of speech rules to slander the Pope, 
virtually no-one said the same thing with regard to Muhammad. The professor could not 
explain from the answers why that difference had occurred, given that neither person holds 
divine status in the respective religions and are merely messengers and/or representatives of 
the deity on earth. Could the fact that the Christian/Catholic reaction to such vilifications as a 
matter of experience does not entail violence against persons or objects have had something 
to do with it, and that the students had already internalised this reality in their academic 
value-ranking framework?8 
                                                          
5 Online at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html. 
6 G.E. Attia, Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, (London: The International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 2007) 153. 
7 However, even there one can sometimes experience drastic reactions. After sending my paper “Political Islam 
and Non-Muslim Religions: A Lesson from Lessing for the Arab Transition”, Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, 25 (2014): 27, to a number of Muslim colleagues, I was promptly disinvited from teaching on a 
course at a law school in a Muslim country, which shall remain unnamed. 
8 Despite what I said in the preceding footnote, this potential internalisation in an academic context may, 
however, sometimes be based on insufficient first-hand evidence and ignorance of the actual reaction, which 
may often be based simply on linguistic or cultural barriers, as the following anecdotal piece of evidence may 
help to clarify. At an international conference in 2007 on Islamic criminal justice at a university in the UAE, I 
spoke about the Western view of certain more glaring aspects of the Islamic system which are by and large seen 
as barbaric and/or draconian or questionable under the rule of law as understood by scholars and practitioners in 
the West, and I said so quite clearly. When I was finished, there was a deathly silence in the 400+ seats lecture 
theatre and only maybe five or six Egyptian judges in the front row gave some polite applause. In the discussion, 
I received some flak from a Muslim colleague that I allegedly misquoted Muhammad (which I had not) and a 
(quite friendly) comment from a Saudi academic which more or less went into the direction that we should let 
each other abide in our respective systems and not criticise each other. Not very encouraging for a critical 
dialogue, it seemed to me. Yet, a British Muslim colleague who spoke Arabic told me afterwards that my paper 
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1.3 Using the Maqāṣid al-Shari‛ah and General Principles of Law to Enhance the 
 Conversation 
Be that as it may, the time is ripe for a fact-based discussion between Islamic and secular 
scholars, one that does not get bogged down by ever-present concerns of ideological and 
religious sensitivities but which focuses on the maqāṣid and principles of law which guide 
both paradigmatic approaches. A debate that, while it pulls no scholarly punches, is prepared 
to risk the revelation that both systems may be less different than their theoretical foundations 
might lead one to assume and less than their more vocal proponents are prone to claim. The 
apparent innate conviction of many Islamic scholars as, for example, evidenced by Attia’s 
quote above, that the Shari‛ah is the best system imaginable for everyone, is as wrong as the 
secular view of the Islamic jurisprudential approach is outdated. We need to stop talking to 
each other merely about our own respective systems in a more or less descriptive explanatory 
or at best apologetic fashion and should start to engage in talking together about both systems 
in a proper scholarly and analytical manner that also recognises social and political realities 
and does not restrict itself to a doctrinal Glasperlenspiel. Otherwise there will never be 
progress to a dialogue as the word is commonly understood. There should, to put it bluntly, be 
no more holy cows on either side. 
 Every society, no matter on what foundation its cultural and moral environment is 
based, at some stage develops a set of fundamental guiding principles which inform the 
interpretation and application of morals, and in the formal framework of regulation by the 
state, of its laws. In Islamic law, we have as a prime example the so-called five higher intents 
or maqāṣid, which aim at the protection of certain basic values in society, namely religion, 
life, lineage, intellect and property. It contains material ethical principles for the 
implementation of these five ideals, such as maṣlaḥaḥ murṣala, i.e. enhancing the benefit for 
the public interest of every action, istiḥṣan (juristic preference) the ‘blocking of means’ (sadd 
al-dhari‛ah) and the ban on manipulation (tahayyul) if using lawful means could lead to an 
unlawful or immoral effect, the idea of necessity (ḍarūrāt), etc. While secular law does no 
longer recognise the protection of religion and lineage9 as legitimate purposes per se but has, 
for example, moved to the protection of freedom and exercise of religion and speech or the 
protection of children’s inheritance rights even if born out of wedlock, it does contain 
principles that refer to the protection of life (homicide and abortion offences, for example, as 
well as social welfare in the wider sense and medical care provision) and naturally property 
(in all areas of law: civil, criminal, administrative and constitutional). The protection of the 
intellect is also clearly a major interest, as can be seen at the example of legislation relating to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was the talk of the town over lunch, as it were, among the locals. I am unsure to what extent that really was the 
case, but if it was, then it seems remarkable that no-one approached me for further discussion – whether that had 
to do with customary Arab politeness towards a guest which did not allow for any expression of criticism, with 
genuine lack of academic interest to pursue the matter, or because my talk had struck a chord with some people 
who did, however, not wish to acknowledge it vis-à-vis a non-Muslim, I do not know. This lack of a clear 
indication, for whatever reason, provides no sound basis for progress. 
9 Especially sexual offences such as adultery, rape, etc., are either no longer recognised as worthy of criminal 
sanction (adultery) or have been based on different legal interests than ‘lineage’ in its original sense would 
suggest. Similarly, distinctions based on social status as made by Mālik ibn Anas in his Al-Muwaṭṭa’ for rape are 
massively outdated. See the Al-Muwaṭṭa’ of Imām Mālik Ibn Anas, translation by Aisha A. Bewley, (London: 
Portobello Books, 2001), para. 36.16., where Mālik advocates that the rapist of a slave girl should “pay what he 
has diminished of her worth”. No modern Muslim would still consider this an acceptable rule. Indeed, modern 
Islam also frowns upon slavery, while neither the Qur’ān nor Muhammad demanded its immediate abolition at 
the time – much like the views of St. Paul in the Christian textual tradition. See his Letter to Philemon which is 
referenced, for example, in the Encyclical ‘Spe Salvi’ of Pope Benedict XVI of 30 November 2007, in which he 
states that Christianity did not bring a “message of social revolution” (original: “Christianismus non 
proclamaverat socialem et turbulentum nuntium.”) – Spe Salvi, para. 4 (link to the English version online under 
‘Encyclicals’ at: www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/index.htm). 
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drug and alcohol consumption, the protection of juveniles from (hard) pornography and 
depictions of violence, etc. – obviously there are differences in the views as to what degree of 
protection is needed and almost all protection of that sort usually totally or gradually ends 
when a person comes of age, be it at the ages of 18 or 21. Secular law also possesses ethical 
implementation principles that are close mirror images of those in Islamic law: the principle 
of protecting the public interest or public policy, the ban against abuse of formal legal 
positions, necessity, etc. A few examples from German and English law shall highlight these 
similarities. German civil law in the Civil Code10 contains numerous general provisions that 
speak to principles that Islamic law would very likely put under the general categories 
mentioned above, and they merit being reproduced here in some detail: 
 
(a) Sections 133, 134 and 138 on the interpretation of declarations under law and the effect of 
violations of certain rules: 
 
Section 133: Interpretation of a declaration of intent 
When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the true 
intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration. 
 
Section 134: Statutory prohibition 
A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads 
to a different conclusion. 
  
Section 138: Legal transaction contrary to public policy; usury 
(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void. 
(2) In particular, a legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the 
predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable weakness of will 
of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to 
be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the 
performance. 
 
(b) Sections 226 and 228 on abuse of rights and necessity: 
 
Section 226: Prohibition of chicanery 
The exercise of a right is not permitted if its only possible purpose consists in causing 
damage to another. 
 
Section 228: Necessity 
A person who damages or destroys a thing belonging to another in order to ward off 
from himself or from another a danger emanating from the thing does not act 
unlawfully if the damage or destruction is necessary to ward off the danger and the 
damage is not out of proportion to the danger. If the person acting in this manner 
caused the danger, he is obliged to pay damages. 
  
(c) Section 242, one of the central provisions of German civil law, on good faith: 
 
Section 242: Performance in good faith 
A debtor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration. 
                                                          
10  Taken from http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html – with some modifications by the 
author. 
6 
 
(d) Section 817 on unjust enrichment: 
 
Section 817: Breach of law or public policy 
If the purpose of performance was determined in such a way that that the recipient, in 
accepting it, was violating a statutory prohibition or public policy, then the recipient is 
obliged to make restitution. A claim for return is excluded if the person who rendered 
performance was likewise guilty of such a breach, unless the performance consisted in 
entering into an obligation; restitution may not be demanded of any performance 
rendered in fulfilment of such an obligation. 
 
An example of ‘blocking the means’ comes – hardly surprisingly – from tax law, in the 
following sections of the German Fiscal Code:11 
 
Section 40: Actions contrary to law or public policy 
It shall be immaterial for taxation when an action that is completely or partly taxable 
violates a statutory regulation or prohibition or is contrary to public policy. 
 
Section 41: Invalid legal transactions 
(1) Where a legal transaction is or becomes invalid this shall be immaterial for 
taxation to the extent that and as long as the persons involved nevertheless allow the 
economic outcome of this legal transaction to occur and to remain. This shall not 
apply where the tax laws provide otherwise. 
(2) Fictitious transactions and actions shall be immaterial for taxation. Where a 
fictitious transaction conceals another legal transaction, the concealed legal 
transaction shall be decisive for taxation.  
 
Section 42: Abuse of tax planning schemes 
(1) It shall not be possible to circumvent tax legislation by abusing legal options for 
tax planning schemes. Where the element of an individual tax law’s provision to 
prevent circumventions of tax has been fulfilled, the legal consequences shall be 
determined pursuant to that provision. Where this is not the case, the tax claim shall in 
the event of an abuse within the meaning of subsection (2) below arise in the same 
manner as it arises through the use of legal options appropriate to the economic 
transactions concerned.  
(2) An abuse shall be deemed to exist where an inappropriate legal option is selected 
which, in comparison with an appropriate option, leads to tax advantages unintended 
by law for the taxpayer or a third party. This shall not apply where the taxpayer 
provides evidence of non-tax reasons for the selected option which are relevant when 
viewed from an overall perspective. 
 
English law has the law of equity, which arose as a corrective to the often overly harsh 
application of the Sovereign’s law as implemented by the King and/or his judiciary (also 
called the ‘common law’), and was developed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as set out 
in one of the quotes at the beginning. The principles of equity also tie in very well with the 
general purpose behind the concept of maṣlaḥaḥ in its wider sense, and just a few shall be 
mentioned here:  
 
                                                          
11 Taken from http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ao/englisch_ao.html#p0234. 
7 
 Equity follows the law.12 
 Where the equities are equal, the law prevails. Where the equities are equal, the 
first in time prevails.13 
 Equity looks to the substance rather than the form.14 
 Equity will not permit a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud.15 
 Equity regards as done that which ought to be done.16 
 He who seeks equity must do equity.17 
 He who comes to equity must come with clean hands.18 
 
The picture that emerges from these few examples is that all of the above have overlapping 
basic rules and ethical ideas about how the public interest should be served – whether they 
are ultimately based on religious commands or not. This realisation should ideally serve as a 
basis for further conversation. However, there are some issues which may impede this 
conversation, and we turn to them next. 
 
 
2  Obstacles to a Genuine Dialogue – Systemic Sensitivities and Ambiguities 
 
2.1 Allegations of Backwardness and Being Unprincipled 
Traditional Islamic law, or the Shari‛ah, has often been seen as a backward and unprincipled 
legal system by lawyers in advanced secular jurisdictions, as exemplified by the first 
quotation above. However, as the second citation shows, not so long ago similar concerns 
were raised in England about the lack of contours of the new stream of law called ‘equity’ 
which was then administered not by the King’s Courts but by the Lord Chancellor as a 
remedy against the often overly strict interpretation of the common law. Based on the two 
main sources from the 7th century CE, the Qur’ān and the sayings and acts, or the Sunnah, of 
Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, the Shari‛ah had over the centuries been expounded and 
explored mainly by a class of private religious and jurist scholars, the ulama or fuqahā’, from 
the Arabic expression for the discipline of jurisprudence, uṣūl al-fiqh. The discipline 
flourished in the early period of Islam with scholars operating in a search for consensus 
(ijmā‛) and the use of analogical reasoning (qiyās), although the latter is called into question 
as a permissible method by Shi’a teaching. There was and is doubt among the more 
traditional Islamic scholars whether, to what extent, and in which framework any new 
jurisprudential developments, based on independent reasoning, or ijtihād, after the 10th 
century were possible or needed at all – the so-called closure of the gate to ijtihād. 
 Others argue that Islamic law was and is flexible and – within certain parameters set 
by allegedly clear and undisputable guidance from the two primary sources – amenable to 
being adapted to the needs and exigencies of the changing times.19 In modern times, however, 
there are also calls for a return to the roots of the time of the Companions and the state of 
                                                          
12 Re Diplock [1948] 2 All ER 318. 
13 Pilcher v. Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 250; Abigail v. Lapin [1934] AC 491. 
14 Parkin v. Thorold (1852) 16 Beav 59. 
15 Bannister v. Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133.  
16 Rayner v. Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1. 
17 Haywood v. Cope (1858) 25 Beav 140; Chappell v. Times Newspapers [1975] 2 All ER 233. 
18 Cross v. Cross (1983) 4 FLR 235; Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318. 
19 On the development at the example of major juristic figures, see O. Arabi, D.S. Powers and S.A. Spectorsky 
(Eds.), Islamic Legal Thought – A Compendium of Muslim Jurists, (Leiden: Brill, 2013). However, a paper by 
W.B. Hallaq from 1985 seems to suggest that this may not be the case: “The Logic of Legal Reasoning in 
Religious and Non-Religious Cultures”, Clev. St. L. Rev., 34/79 (1985–1986): 17. 
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affairs in Medina, where Muhammad formed the nucleus of what one might call the rules of 
government and relations between its citizens in an Islamic body politic – an issue which had 
already had a major impact on the legal thinking of one of the great four school founders, 
Mālik ibn Anas, founder of the Mālikī tradition. As the third and famous quote above shows, 
Islamic law very early on subscribed to a hierarchy of norms which in theory, albeit a 
methodologically not yet very sophisticated theory, belies the allegation that Islamic judges 
were entirely free-wheeling in their application of whatever sources came to hand, and its 
wisdom about the inevitable lacunae in any body of law resonates with secular lawyers who 
operate within a system of hierarchical norms, most often with a constitution at its apex and 
primary and secondary legislation below, all of which are in need of interpretation, and 
occasionally, careful extension by analogy. 
 That being said, it is nonetheless striking that if one looks even at modern textbooks 
and explanations of Islamic law and finance, for example, often written by people with 
massive experience in the modern world of capital markets, asset-backed securities and 
financial derivative products, one finds examples from the early Islamic period of agriculture 
and cattle herding being used to explain Islamic ideas about contract law, etc. 20  Not 
infrequently, the kind of argument employed in these treatises, seems also bound by the 
prevailing ethics and business morals21 at the time of early Islam. Even academic writings by 
modern Muslim scholars about Islamic law, depending on how conservative they are, may 
feature a ritualistic element, anachronistic and out of place to Western eyes in the context of 
academia, when they add in brackets behind every mention of Muhammad the acronym 
‘pbuh’ meaning ‘peace be upon him’, sometimes using the Arabic letters in transliteration, or 
even calligraphic Arabic in a kind of miniature inset; similar formulae are used for God or the 
Companions or other major historic figures of Islam. The material style of argument is 
sometimes reminiscent of the European period of scholasticism and not that dissimilar to, for 
example, the patterns of reasoning employed in the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, and it is acknowledged by some modern Islamic scholars that Islamic law to this 
day lacks sufficient attempts at abstraction.22 The exposition furthermore often suffers from 
an idealisation of the Islamic sources which overlooks the compromises made in practice 
over time as, for example, those made by Islamic rulers with foreign powers in the so-called 
‘capitulations’, i.e. treaties which allowed foreign traders and merchants to use their own 
laws when dealing in Muslim countries, which led to Muslim businessmen using Christian 
and Jewish intermediaries, who as dhimmi were allowed to retain their own legal culture and 
courts.23 This seems especially true with one of the main contentious topics, the taking of 
interest on loans, which is prohibited as ribā.24 
 
                                                          
20 Consistent and recurring usage of such examples, for example, in Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic 
Finance, (Chichester: Wiley, 2007); and Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Shari‛ah, 
translation by Mohamed el-Tahir el-Mesawi, (London/Washington: The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2006). 
21 At the same conference mentioned in supra note 8, a distinguished professor from Oman argued in a private 
conversation in our hotel that corporal punishment including cutting off hands, etc., was to be preferred over 
prison sentences, because the latter had a secondary criminogenic and stigmatising quality – which is as such 
correct – and that the offender under Islamic law could return to society immediately, thus aiding his 
resocialisation and rehabilitation and avoiding the massive costs entailed by a custodial sentence. Another 
academic whose topic was the application of Shari‛ah law to IT crime – a really breath-taking idea as such – 
used the example of boys using their mobile phones for sending text messages to girls. 
22 Wallaq, supra note 4.  
23T. Kuran, The Long Divergence – How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle-East, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011),   p. 209. 
24 Ibid., p. 143. 
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2.2  Linguistic Hurdles 
Furthermore, as this very article has shown on the first few pages, the discourse about Islamic 
law outside the Arab world is beset by the need – or maybe only by a largely unquestioned 
custom – to use arcane Arabic terminology, in Latin script transliteration for those who do not 
speak Arabic, which in turn needs lengthy explanations to match it to modern European legal 
linguistic concepts, because as someone once quipped, “every Arabic word means either 
itself, its direct opposite or a camel”: 25  Arabic words have a rich variety of idiomatic 
connotations depending very much on context and since the prevailing direction of exposition 
in the trans-systemic conversation so far has been the explanation from the Islamic view to 
the outside world and not a mutual critical dialogue, there has been an apparent lack of 
endeavour to come to a common terminology that does not require non-Arabs to have a 
dictionary with them at all times or learn Arabic from scratch, an option that will seriously 
reduce the participation of the European linguists in the debate and which can serve, as I have 
observed on occasion, as a knock-down argument by Arab colleagues that since one does not 
speak the language (properly), one does not really know what one is talking about.26 This 
applies particularly to the Qur’ān of which it is said that no translation can be made but only 
translations of its meaning – which, since the vast majority of Muslims worldwide do not 
speak Arabic as their mother tongue, let alone classical Qur’ānic Arabic, seems to defeat the 
purpose of translating it in the first place – and raises the question of what is more important, 
the words or their meaning. Using the Arabic original in that manner can thus also be abused 
into a bid to retain the Deutungshoheit, i.e., the interpretational supremacy, over the text. 
Even non-Arabs trained in the language to an appropriate standard will have difficulties 
arguing with native speakers, as is the case in any language. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Incongruence 
Combined with the virtual absence of a joint non-Arabic legal terminology, which one could 
always say is after all not the Arabs’ problem, we find a much more problematic concern, and 
that is the apparent incongruence of the sources of law. Going back to what we saw earlier, 
the primary sources of all Islamic law in the traditional sense are in Islamic understanding 
either divine (Qur’ān) or quasi-divine (Sunnah) and thus in principle exempt from all and any 
criticism, in the case of the Sunnah with the added qualifier that any individual ḥadīth has to 
be accepted as an authentic tradition, a matter over which there has always been a lively 
debate, both as far as their chain of authoritative references as well as their contents are 
concerned. Any other source, such as custom and especially if it stems from pre-Islamic 
times, must be in compliance with the primary sources. Historical-critical research as 
understood, for example, in biblical studies, into the origins of the Qur’ān is mostly 
discouraged outright because it carries with it the idea of a constitutive human involvement in 
its creation rather than of a merely receptive role of Muhammad. The Qur’ān, as most 
Muslim scholars will readily accept, is not primarily meant to be a book of law but an 
account of God’s relationship to and purpose for creation, and humans in particular. It does 
contain some legal verses, the number of which varies according to who does the counting, 
but they are few and far between. There are more sayings of Muhammad that may have a 
law-related content in the wider sense, but even with them a Western observer cannot always 
shake the impression that in quite a number of cases that content is minimal or vague at best 
and/or appears to be used in the sense and for the purposes of the person using it to support a 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/003264.html. 
26 See also my paper, M. Bohlander, “Political Islam and Non-Muslim Religions – A Lesson from Lessing for 
the Arab Transition”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 27 (2014): 39. 
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certain conclusion based on the user’s prior understanding, 27  a practice not unknown in 
secular legal argument, either. Muhammad himself is on record as having strongly 
discouraged his followers from writing down and thus institutionalising his own sayings as 
opposed to his recitations of the Qur’ān on certain occasions: “Do not take down anything 
from me, and anyone who has taken down anything from me, except the Qur’ān, should 
efface it”.28 
 However, and this is foreshadowing the analytical lens of ambiguity addressed in the 
next section, there is also some evidence to the contrary as, for example, with the instance at 
Muhammad’s dying bed when he asked the Companions to bring him paper so he could 
dictate some final instructions to prevent them from falling into error after his death. Because 
they actually started to argue in front of Muhammad about the permissibility of writing down 
anything but the Qur’ān, even though he himself had initiated it, he ultimately sent them 
away, saying he was better in his state than they with their squabbling.29  
 Ibn Ashur, for example, sees this “lack of keenness to perform an act” as a sign of a 
lack of will on Muhammad’s part to legislate within the context of the Sunnah.30 From the 
verse in Q3:144, which states that Muhammad is only an apostle, Ibn Ashur deduces that as 
far as the “general condition of the Muslim community” is concerned, Muslims should 
consider “statements and deeds” of Muhammad as a “matter of legislation, unless there is 
circumstantial evidence to the contrary”31 – in effect leaving a back door open to deviate from 
the Sunnah. I have pointed out elsewhere the findings of modern ḥadīth research32 that the 
conceptual ontological hierarchy between Qur’ān and Sunnah has not been observed in the 
Islamic history of jurisprudence, with the latter de facto gaining interpretative supremacy 
over the former. 
 
2.4 The ‘Culture of Ambiguity’ and Jurisprudence 
From arguments such as these and similar ones on Islamic jurisprudential history, most 
prominently for example, Thomas Bauer’s work on the “culture of ambiguity”, 33  some 
scholars such as Rüdiger Lohlker – who explicitly references Bauer34 – deduce that there is 
already a mixture of the religious and the secular in Islamic law-making, with the ‘secular’ 
referring to the purely juridical patterns of argument based on contextual logic and not 
directly on religious influence – these work together not in a hierarchically structured top-
down fashion as most often depicted in a typical tree-diagram, but as interdependent yet 
distinct points of departure like the webs of plant roots observed in botanical sciences, the so-
called ‘rhizomes’, a simple form of which looks like as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 A telling recent example is the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in Qureshi v. Pakistan 
[1991] XLIII All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 10.  
28 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth No. 3004. – Ibn Ashur, supra note 20 at 138, opines that Muhammad may perhaps have 
said that with respect to rulings in individual cases, to prevent ‘generalization and particularization’. 
29 Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī, Ḥadīth No. 3053. 
30 Ibn Ashur, supra note 20, at 50. 
31 Ibid. 
32 “There is no compulsion in religion” – Freedom of religion, responsibility to protect (R2P) and crimes against 
humanity at the example of the Islamic blasphemy laws of Pakistan: Journal of Islamic State Practices in 
International Law, 8 (2012): 36. 
33 Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität – Einde andere Geschichte des Islams, (Berlin: Verlag der 
Weltreligionen, 2011). 
34 Rüdiger Lohlker, Islamisches Recht (Vienna: Facultas, 2012), pp 15, 35. 
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FIGURE 1   Rhizome model I
35
 
 
 
A more complex model with multiple interlocking connections which better fits the picture 
used by Lohlker for Islamic legal thinking could be imagined as in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE  2  Rhizome model II36 
 
Lohlker37 bases this theoretical approach on the philosophical work of Deleuze/Guattari.38 
Yet while this model may be useful in describing the process of juridical argument, it is less 
helpful in explaining the substance of the rules thus arrived at, which may be under a much 
stronger influence of the religious than the process. In other words, even if one uses general 
juridical logic, the original building blocks will still largely emanate from the religious 
foundation, unless one wanted to argue that the jurists’ extrapolations over time have become 
sources in themselves and are in that sense removed from the religious, an argument which I 
do ultimately not find convincing since they function at best as a sort of shorthand reference 
for their own underlying views in a chain of regression to the primary sources. Insofar as 
Lohlker appears to argue that the temporal rulers in Islamic history not infrequently opposed 
the teachings of the Islamic scholars of the ulama (who did so vice-versa) and thus may have 
helped create a less religiously strict or traditional legal framework39 that has allowed the rise 
of more secular facets of inductive reasoning, he is, of course, potentially making an 
inadmissible argument from individual factual rule violation to general normative rule 
                                                          
35 Source: http://www.urbagram.net/images/topo_rhizome2.jpg. 
36 Source: http://www.librarystudentjournal.org/index.php/lsj/article/view/34/36. 
37 Supra note 34, at 41. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., 33 pp. 
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genesis – in other words, he may be arguing from an illegal is to a legitimate ought. While 
this may to some extent be feasible in a purely custom-based system of norm creation, it is a 
questionable exercise in the context of an already existing overarching normative framework 
determined by the Qur’ān and the Sunnah as its joint primary parameters, and as Lohlker 
himself admits40 does not match the drift of the modern attempts by the Salafist movement, 
for example, to return to those primary roots and strip away the centuries of jurisprudential 
overgrowth – notwithstanding the fact that the Salafist arguments overlook the banal fact that 
even they will need interpreters of these primary sources which will make the process of 
overgrowth start anew. Even in the temporal manifestations of the legal foundations of 
Islamic countries, i.e., their written constitutions, we will find evocations of the Shari‛ah as 
the supreme law of the land.41 It is therefore doubtful whether this reference to a partially 
‘secular’ nature of Islamic jurisprudence substantially advances the debate. 
 
2.5 Secular Comparisons 
Secular sources of law, while undoubtedly owing in their development over the centuries, for 
example, to Judeo-Christian values, many of which now have turned into seemingly 
independent and free-standing humanistic values, are no longer seen as in any way divine, 
despite the ubiquitous invocations of God or faith-based references in some national 
constitutions. 42  Because a large number of people these days no longer recognise why 
religion should hold any sway over their social interactions and their personal lives, the 
ethical and moral principles embedded in previous religious commands have taken on a life 
of their own. This can, however, also make it difficult to justify their continued observance 
with the changing times, customs or even major geopolitical transmogrifications based on 
mass migration, for example. They have become decoupled from their source and 
consequently a different kind of ambiguity has arisen in the secular system. While those who 
still hold religious beliefs have to confront the need for a harmonisation of the manifold and 
diverse contemporary interpretations of the religiously based rules of their own and possibly 
of other religious frameworks, those who do not hold such beliefs find themselves robbed of 
a safe and clear measure43 that would help them determine right ethical behaviour, and are 
thrown back upon the necessity of balancing competing interests in a quasi-utilitarian 
fashion. In its most extreme form, this decoupling leads to superficially ‘scientific’ ideologies 
such as the reductionism favoured by Richard Dawkins and his ilk who decry any references 
to supernatural factors or a God as unnecessary and indeed deluded.44 All human activity, 
including neural activity, is biology; all biology is chemistry and ultimately all chemistry is 
physics, which in the final analysis is particle physics and quantum mechanics. The 
assumption or realisation that no God may be needed to explain natural phenomena has led 
many to believe – and the word is chosen intentionally here – that absence of need implies 
absence as such, a logically impermissible fallacy. In any event, while decoupled but 
nonetheless observed moral rules may in turn fall under utilitarian attack and struggle to 
mount a believable ontological defence, a reductionist world view struggles to make a case 
for ethical principles in the first place. On a philosophical and theoretical level, the secular 
approach, despite its intellectual preening, is thus not that far removed from the ambiguity of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
                                                          
40 Ibid., pp. 21, 47. 
41 See, e.g., the constitutions of Egypt, Afghanistan, or Iraq. 
42 See, e.g., the constitutions of Germany, the United States and the practice in the United Kingdom, where the 
monarch as head of state and of the Church of England is called the ‘defender of the faith’. 
43 Incidentally, this is one reason why conservative or radical ideologies of any kind have such great appeal to 
many people these days. 
44 So the title of the book by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Black Swan, 2007). 
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 This theoretical ambiguity is mirrored on the legal ‘factory floor’, as it were. Secular 
common and civil law systems use either a doctrine of binding precedent (stare decisis) in a 
pattern of inductive law-making or more or less wide-ranging codifications to achieve legal 
certainty in a deductive fashion top-down. In most cases a mixture of both will operate, 
because even in code-based systems the corrective and corrosive effects of judicial 
interpretation are well known and the restrictive effect of binding precedent can be avoided 
by creative use of the instrument of distinguishing or by plainly – albeit illogically – 
“restricting a case to its own facts”.45 Even in systems that do not subscribe to judicial rules 
of stare decisis, the practical necessities of judicial economy lead to a factual observance of 
the views of the appellate courts of the respective jurisdictions, yet even that will not 
guarantee a uniform application of the law. In a federal civil law system which does not 
recognise binding precedent such as, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
operates a three-tier state and (mostly) appellate-only federal judiciary, this may mean that 
the lower courts in each state, especially in civil cases, will primarily often follow their own 
state supreme appellate court because they will be the ones directly reviewing their 
judgments on appeal – and in some of the larger states there are several state supreme court 
districts which may differ in turn from each other. The supreme courts of the different states 
often diverge in their approach to a certain legal question and they may – absent binding 
precedent – disagree even with the federal supreme court and the federal constitutional court, 
since the latter’s decisions do not in all cases have the force of an act of Parliament (for 
exceptions see s. 31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act). Even in cases where the law 
would appear to be clear, the courts have managed to be creative by coming to conclusions 
that portend to be praeter legem, i.e., outside the codified system but not in contradiction to 
it, for example, by claiming the need to close a lacuna in the law. Sometimes courts have 
been even bolder and decided contra legem, i.e., they risked directly antagonising the law-
maker; however, the constitution provides for a number of pathways to the federal 
constitutional court in order to ensure a joint-up approach to the most fundamental questions 
and to keep some of the too creative judges in check. Similar avenues exist in other 
jurisdictions. The potential for ambiguity is nonetheless striking. 
 Yet, there is no screaming anarchy in the system because all the judges, prosecutors 
and lawyers undergo essentially the same lengthy training and most of them use their 
common sense once they are in practice. In the German system of a career judiciary the 
institutional socialisation of novice judges is ensured by the fact that they often work in 
panels presided over by an older and more experienced judge and with another more 
experienced assessor, or by regular secondments or transfers to the prosecution service, either 
during the initial probationary period or later as a way of moving up the ladder of promotion. 
If we re-transpose this picture into the Islamic environment it becomes immediately apparent 
that such pragmatic streamlining and socialisation functions are provided in Islamic law by 
the different schools of law and the long periods of training in them,46 some of which have 
often been decreed by fiat of a ruler or government as the only applicable and valid school in 
a certain jurisdiction. Customary Shari‛ah additionally counters any potentially adverse effect 
of a too rigid observance of any one school by the principle of takhāyur, or freedom of choice 
between the views of the different schools as best befits the law-seeker in any individual case, 
or to put it less charitably, it allows jurisprudential cherry-picking. Inversely, the phenomenon 
of talfīq, i.e., amalgamation, allows the diverse schools to bridge differences and come to 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., R. v. Turbill and Broadway [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 7 at para 12; Sandeman Coprimar SA v. Transitos y 
Transportes Integrales SL and Others [2003] Q.B. 1270 at 1276. 
46 Although some scholars have recently doubted the continued relevance of the schools for matters of worldly 
rather than religious rule interpretation, see Rohe, supra note 2 at 189. 
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joint opinions.47 Similarly, the ontologically problematic prevalence of the Sunnah over the 
Qur’ān is mirrored, for example, albeit to a lesser degree, in the German judges’ willingness 
to create law alongside existing legislation, and in some cases even to tackle the latter head-
on if it is deemed necessary, especially when the violation of the so-called ‘Radbruch 
formula’ is at stake.48 
 
 
3 Building the Future Conversation 
 
Such is the fruit of logic. It also affords acquaintance with the doctrines and opinions 
of the people of the world. One knows what harm it can do. Therefore the student 
should beware of its pernicious aspects as much as he can. Whoever studies it should 
do so only after he is saturated with the religious law and has studied the 
interpretation of the Qur’ān and jurisprudence. No one who has no knowledge of the 
Muslim religious sciences should apply himself to it. Without that knowledge, he 
can hardly remain safe from its pernicious aspects. 
Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) 
The Muqaddimah – An Introduction to History
49
 
 
Since we have seen that Islamic and secular scholars do apparently not work that differently 
once they have been given their building blocks to construct the edifice of law, we should 
move forward to discussing areas of substance instead of individual questions or matters of 
ontological provenance, and begin with the guiding principles that are the major arteries of 
each body of law. One caveat may be apposite at this juncture. It is unlikely that Islamic 
mainstream juridical methodology will anytime soon shed its religious roots in favour of a 
separated model that distinguishes between the religious obligations of the Muslims as 
believers and the needs of all inhabitants of a country as its equal citizens and makes the 
latter the basis for its legal paradigms.50 Discussions about the value or not of adducing 
religious revelation and prophetical practice from the 7th century as a primary basis for legal 
rules in the pluralist global environment of the 21st century are legitimate and have their place 
in the theological or philosophical-political debate, yet they will not aid in advancing the 
discussion that must be had about the similarities and differences of Islamic and secular 
moral and legal principles that should guide the worldly ruler, since the ontological 
discussion about the validity of roots is bound to lead to antagonism and frictions – the 
concern over Muslim parallel societies in secular countries is an example for these. That 
does, however, not absolve the Muslim side to the conversation from facing up to the realities 
and undertaking its own efforts at mitigating the nature of their expressions about and effects 
of their ontological disagreement on the development of the global discourse, unless they 
want to run the risk of being accused of a continuing stance of moral superiority or a lack of 
willingness to engage with other views on an equal footing. 
                                                          
47 See Rohe, supra note 2. 
48 The German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch coined the formula which states that citizens owe obedience 
to the positive legal order, i.e., the laws and acts of parliament, etc., unless such obedience would result in an 
unacceptable violation of fundamental tenets of natural justice. 
49 Translated by Franz Rosenthal, 1967; Princeton Classic edn. (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
405 pp. 
50  See in this context the brilliant analysis by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State. 
Negotiating the Future of Shari`a (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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 The debate needs the input of open-minded discussants from both sides. In a previous 
paper,51 my Iranian colleague Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki and I had proposed the creation 
of a ‘Centre for Global Ijmā‛, a vision that may have been too optimistic at the time – and 
probably still is – and whose name may additionally have raised eyebrows among some 
Muslim colleagues. Interestingly in this context, Siti Faridah Abd Jabbar, has the following to 
say about the problem of Shari‛ah compliance councils within Islamic finance: 
 
The problems of differing Shari‛ah pronouncements, the shortage of Shari‛ah 
scholars, payments of exorbitant consultation fees to Shari‛ah scholars, and the 
potential problems of conflict of interest, conflict of duties, breach of confidence, and 
insider dealing are not, however, issues that cannot be entirely resolved. What may be 
done to overcome these problems as well as circumventing the potential ones is by 
establishing a universally accepted central religious authority representing the 
different schools of thought where Shari‛ah scholars the world over are pooled 
together under the authority’s roof. The religious authority may be set up under the 
auspices of an international Islamic organisation such as the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference or the Islamic Development Bank and may be funded by the 
levies imposed on the financial institutions that seek the authority’s guidance and 
approval. The setting up of the central religious authority would bring about the 
uniformity of Shari‛ah pronouncements; give all financial institutions, and not merely 
the well-established and high-paying ones, access to the services of the most eminent 
Shari‛ah scholars; assist in expediting the approval and introduction of new financial 
instruments into the Islamic financial industry; and above all, do justice to Islamic 
finance which is intrinsically good but severely misconceived owing to the failings of 
mankind.52 
 
Nonetheless, outside the Islamic environment, the necessity of a joint-up and sustained open 
and critical discussion between qualified scholars and practitioners from both sides gains 
increasing significance, a discussion that goes beyond a perpetual exchange of points of view 
but which is supported by the earnest desire to understand and learn from each other’s 
traditions – and to put the lessons learned into practice. The scepticism of Ibn Khaldūn from 
the 15th century that such an effort would be pernicious rather than beneficial should be laid 
to rest. 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 M. Bohlander and Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki, :Criminal Justice under Shari‛ah in the 21st century: An 
Inter-cultural View”, Arab Law Quarterly  23 (2009): 417. 
52 “The Shari‛ah Supervisory Board: a potential problem in Islamic finance?”, Company Lawyer (2008): 31. 
